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James E. Fleming*
Linda C. McClain**
We wish to begin by thanking Constitutional Commentary
for publishing these three thoughtful reviews of our book,
Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues. The essays
by Abner Greene, Ken Kersch, and Toni Massaro 1 reflect a rich
and illuminating range of perspectives on our project. We will
respond briefly to each.
I. TONI M. MASSARO, SOME REALISM ABOUT

CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERALISM
We are grateful to Toni Massaro for her careful and
sympathetic reading of our book. It is encouraging that she
believes that Ordered Liberty contributes to making sense of
contemporary rights practice- and liberal democracy- in the
United States. We concur with her that the November 2012
election provides a useful opportunity, both before the election,
when she wrote her review, and after, as we write this response,
to reflect on "the national mood" with respect to the evident
competing visions of government "as ally" versus government

* The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Associate
Dean for Intellectual Life, and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
** Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law. Thanks to Courtney Gesualdi for help with this essay.
1. Abner S. Greene, State Speech and Political Liberalism, 28 CONST. COMM. 421
(2013); Ken I. Kersch, Bringing It All Back Home?, 28 CONST. COMM. 407 (2013); Toni
M. Massaro, Some Realism About Constitutional Liberalism, 28 CONST. COMM. 383
(2013).
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"as antagonist. " 2 She helpfully relates these clashes at the level
of political campaigns to the broader debates over constitutional
law and political theory that we address. M:oreover, it is
especially encouraging that she concludes that the book has
something useful to say to "the various patriot armies marching
under American constitutional banners. " 3 Indeed, this assessment contrasts sharply with that of Ken Kersch, who faults us for
situating our book-including its title-"at a stratospheric level
of abstraction," oblivious to the practical battles of
contemporary social and political movements taking place on the
4
ground below.
Massaro grasps that claims about the Constitution and
about the best balance between rights and responsibilities,
governmental authority and individual liberty, liberty and
equality, and so forth, are at issue in many of these movements.
Again, a contrast with Kersch's review is instructive. While he
views our project as straining to produce a "new liberalism"
relevant to America;~ Massaro perceives that "the scope and
content of constitutional liberalism are very much at issue" in
contemporary national debates about "the proper reach of
government authority."() She indicates that Ordered Liberty can
7
provide " [m ]ore realism about our constitutional liberalism. "
She argues that our book shows "the complexities and paradoxes
of our constitutional law as it is" at a time when "a growing
number of people" argue for "tectonic changes" in it and "some
even favor a second constitutional convention. ,s We consider
our time on the book well spent if a thoughtful scholar like
Massaro draws this conclusion, given her own substantial
contributions to making sense of some of the constitutional
controversies we take on in Ordered Liberty.
In that regard, we especially appreciate her image of a
"liberty spectrum" as a way to characterize what we describe as
thin versus thick justifications for rights, and her observation
that constitutional rights can migrate from one end of the
9
spectrum to the other over time. She offers the example of the
evolving level of constitutional protection for gay men and
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Massaro, supra note 1, at 383.
/d. at 406.
Kersch, supra note 1, at 409.
/d. at 419.
Massaro, supra note 1, at 385.
/d. at 404.
/d. at 403 (emphasis in original).
/d. at 397-400.

2013]

RESPONSE TO THREE VIEWS

437

lesbians, from decriminalizing sodomy on a toleration rationale
to allowing same-sex couples to marry (a move, we suggest,
entailing appeals both to rights and to moral goods (pp. 177206) ). Her point that "constitutional liberalism in practice is both
10
thick and thin" is one missed by Kersch, who views our
approach to rights justification as moving immediately to full
respect and appreciation and leaving out steps along the way.'' It
does not.
Massaro praises us for clearing up many "false dichotomies"
about constitutional liberalism and the relationships among
rights, responsibilities, and virtues. However, she comments that
we introduce a false dichotomy of our own- that between
responsibility as autonomy and responsibility as accountability.' 2
She makes some cogent points here (for example, "one parent's
liberal-inspired civic education may be another's illiberal
inculcation of secular humanism"). She contends: "There is no
such thing as neutral government education, or a neutral
formative project. " 13 This is a fair point. But we do not argue for
neutrality in the sense of a value-free formative project or a
government that is completely neutral about which ends it
should promote. To be sure, some people will reject government's ends as an "orthodoxy" contrary to their basic values. We
used the autonomy/accountability point to stress the importance
of a realm of personal self-government. When we said that the
two were related, we meant to get at the authority of
government to engage in a formative project and also to try to
persuade or promote its own ends. Further, we meant to
acknowledge that, in a regime that protects rights to selfgovernment, there is ample room for non-governmental actorsbe they individual citizens or social movements-to voice views
about rights and their responsible exercise. (pp. 40-45) We
concur with Massaro (as well as with Abner Greene, discussed
below) that a critical distinction between these two forms of
responsibility is that between coercion and persuasion. As
Massaro observes, "responsibility as autonomy more emphati14
cally focuses attention on the liberal concern about coercion."

10.
11.
12.
13.

/d. at 397.
Kersch, supra note 1, at 414-15.
Massaro, supra note 1, at 400-01.
/d. at 401.

14.

/d.
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II. KEN I. KERSCH, BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME?
Kersch titles his essay "Bringing It All Bac:k Home"? As
Bob Dylan fans who love his album of that name, we take the
title as a compliment, even if Kersch did not exactly intend it as
such. It is an unwitting compliment in that, even while Kersch
faults our book for supposedly being pitched, like the work of
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, at "a stratospheric level of
abstraction," 15 he credits us with bringing our analysis back home
to the American constitutional order. What is more, even as he
criticizes our book for aiming at timeless abstractions, he
acknowledges "'the book's ... substantive timeliness" and its
16
"perfect harmony with the moment." We daresay that only
someone with a strong allergic reaction to the very mention of
Rawls and Dworkin would fault our book for a "stratospheric
level of abstraction." We appreciate Massaro's praise for the
concreteness of our engagement with the cases protecting basic
liberties, our understanding of the social movements supporting
(and opposing) recognition of these liberties, and our
justifications for the basic liberties in the context of our present
predicaments.
Further developing his thought about timeliness, Kersch
suggests that the publication of our book dernonstrates that
"[y]et another Owl [of Minerva], it seems, has taken flight." 17 We
take his allusion to Hegel's Owl of Minerva with reference to
our book as another unintended compliment. For, in Hegel's
formulation, the owl has wisdom in understanding an historical
era that has just come to a close. But his allusion is incomplete,
for he does not establish that the era we show wisdom in
understanding has come to a close rather than perhaps faces a
bright future. For the allusion to have genuine purchase here,
the Supreme Court would have to overrule or cut back on
18
Lawrence v. Texas or Planned Parenthood v. Case/ 9 or the
whole line of cases protecting basic liberties under the Due
Process Clause just as we published our book's full and coherent
justification of them-just as our form of civic liberalism had
"gotten right with America" and brought the comrnunitarian and
conservative critics of liberalism "up-to-date, and show[ ed] them

15.
16.
17.

18.
19.

Kersch, supra note 1, at 409.
/d. at 414,419.

/d. at 410.
539 u.s. 558 (2003).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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20

up. " Such changes hardly seem imminent, though we concede
that Kersch could prove to be a seer.
In response to Kersch's criticisms, we shall make several
clarifications of our project, namely: (1) the character of our
synthesis of liberalism and republicanism; (2) our understanding
of "ordered liberty" in relation to Justice Cardozo's; (3) our
invocation of Justice Harlan's idea of the "rational continuum"
of ordered liberty; and (4) our reasons for focusing on the Due
Process Clause as a battleground concerning rights,
responsibilities, and virtues.
A. OUR "GRAND THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS" OF LIBERALISM
AND REPUBLICANISM

We appreciate Kersch's acknowledgment of the ambition of
our project-that it aims at "grand theoretical synthesis" of
liberalism with civic republicanism and communitarianism (and,
we would add, feminism). 21 But we disavow any aim ''to bring
the liberal-communitarian debate to a close." To the contrary,
we seek to advance this debate constructively, with the full
expectation that it will prove enduring or, as he puts it,
22
"perpetual. " We are baffled by his statement that " [a ]mongst
American historians, that debate, under the guise of liberalism
vs. republicanism, was brought (more or less) to a close some
time ago." He suggests that scholarship in constitutional theory
like ours has lagged behind. 23 With all due respect, the debate
among American historians about liberalism versus republicanism to which Kersch refers was a very different debate from that
in which we are engaged in our book. That was a debate
between Louis Hartz on the one hand and Gordon Wood and
24
J.G.A. Pocock on the other hand. That debate centered on the
clash between liberalism and republicanism in the founding of
the American constitutional order.
We do not enter into that debate. We focus on a different
one: how best to justify constitutional rights-in particular, basic
liberties under the Due Process Clause- in the here and now.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Kersch, supra note 1, at 410, 419.
/d. at 409.
/d. at 410.
/d. at 409.

LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 (1969).
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Michael Sandel's civic republican and Cass Sunstein's minimalist
republican criticisms of liberal justifications for the right of
privacy post-1986-when the Supreme Court decided Bowers v.
Hardwick 25 - not the republican versus liberal understanding of
the founding in 1787, are the concerns of our synthesis.
Autonomy versus moral goods (pp. 177-206) and minimalism
versus perfectionism (pp. 207-35) as grounds for justifying basic
liberties are our concerns, not Locke versus 1V1achiavelli in
relation to the American founding. As far as we know,
American historians have hardly begun to consider the former
debate, if at all, though they did exhaustively engage with the
26
latter debate about twenty-five years ago.
B. OUR ASPIRATION TO "ORDERED LIBERTY"
Kersch criticizes our invocation of the concept of "ordered
liberty" along with that of "autonomy." After criticizing the
"characteristic abstractions of this literature," he asks: "And
since when has a commitment to 'dignity,' 'autonomy,' 'equal
concern and respect,' or 'the con1mon good' ever decided a
27
concrete case as a logical deduction from principle?" And he
asks, skeptically, "how much work can the concept [of ordered
liberty] actually do?" 2x Thus, he seems to suggest that our
arguments for basic liberties proceed "as a logical deduction"
from the principle of ordered liberty or autonomy.
We fear that Kersch has misunderstood our argument. First,
we do not present constitutional interpretation of the Due
Process Clause as a matter of making logical deduction from
abstract principles. To the contrary, we present it largely as a
matter of common law interpretation, developing a line of cases
protecting basic liberties through reasoning by analogy from one
case to the next and, over time, elaborating the principles and
frameworks that best fit and justify the cases. (pp . 237-72) That
is, we work up an account of and justification for the line of cases
already decided, concretely. We present the cases as manifesting
a concern to secure the basic liberties that are preconditions for
29
deliberative autonomy. We do not begin with abstract
25.
26.
27.

28.

478 u.s. 186 (1986).
See, e.g.. Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
Kersch. supra note I. at 412.
/d.

29. For fuller elaboration of the idea of "deliberative autonomy," see JAMES E.
FLEMING. SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 89-

111 (2006).
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principles of deliberative autonomy and ordered liberty and
make logical deductions from them to decide cases. Here we
surmise that Kersch's aversion to anything Rawlsian or
Dworkinian may have clouded his reading.
Kersch characterizes "ordered liberty" as Justice Cardozo's
30
phrase in Palko v. Connecticut (1937). He criticizes our account
because we "don't set the context" for Cardozo's usage of the
concept of "ordered liberty," namely, that of distinguishing (1)
those provisions of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental and
therefore "incorporated" by the Fourteenth Amendment and
31
made applicable to the states, and (2) those which are not.
We do not set the context for Cardozo's usage of ordered
liberty because we are not using his conception of ordered
liberty. As a matter of fact, we reject Cardozo's conception. For
one thing, we agree with Justice Black as against Justice Cardozo
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, not just selectively incorporates
some of them. 32 For another, we emphatically reject Cardozo's
conclusion in Palko itself that freedom from double jeopardy is
not a basic liberty protected against state infringement.
More generally, we would insist that the phrase ''ordered
liberty" is nobody's property. It is a phrase in common usage in
political and constitutional discourse. In Palko, Cardozo used
the term in the context of "selective incorporation" of certain
rights enumerated in the provisions of the Bill of Rights through
the Due Process Clause. In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun used
the term in the context of deciding what rights that are not
enumerated in the provisions of the Bill of Rights are
33
nonetheless protected by the Due Process Clause. In Rights
Talk, Mary Ann Glendon used the term "ordered liberty,"
mentioning Cardozo and other sources, to express an aspiration
of communitarians in contrast with what she depicted as liberals'
pursuit of "liberty as license. " 34 In developing a civic liberalism,
we sought to reclaim the concept of ordered liberty from
conservatives like Glendon who in recent years have claimed a
monopoly on it. And we propounded ordered liberty as
30.
(1937)).
31.
32.
33.
34.

Kersch, supra note 1, at 412 (discussing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
!d. at 417.
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,74-75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
410 u.s. 113. 152-54 (1973).

MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 10. 14 (1991).
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encapsulating one of the ends of our constitutional order
proclaimed in the Preamble to the Constitution and one of the
aspirations of our framework for ordering rights, responsibilities,
and virtues. To respond directly to Kersch's challenge, that is the
"work" that ordered liberty actually does in our project, not
35
"logical deduction from principle."
C. OUR INVOCATION OF JUSTICE HARLAN'S IDEA OF THE
"RATIONAL CONTINUUM"

Finally, after characterizing the conservative Justice Harlan
as our "hero," Kersch charges us with selective invocation of
Harlan's constitutional jurisprudence. 36 More generally, he
criticizes our book for its "selection bias" (to which we return
below). He charges that we analyze "a subset of constitutional
cases whose selection is both theoretically and historically
skewed to support [our] thesis," further charging that " [t ]hese
cases do not effectively speak to the full universe of civil liberties
concerns." 37 We set out to write a book that would focus on
demonstrating the ordering of rights, responsibilities, and virtues
in cases protecting substantive basic liberties (or not) under the
Due Process Clause. Hence, we are puzzled by the criticism that
we did not undertake to examine "the full universe of civil
liberties concerns." Indeed we did not.
Let us make clear that in our explication of "the myth of
strict scrutiny for fundamental rights" under the Due Process
Clause in Chapter 9 of our book- when we invoke Harlan's idea
of the "rational continuum" of liberty and judg1nent from his
dissent in Poe v. Ullman 3R as against the idea of absolutist, rigidly
maintained tiers of scrutiny- we are not embracing Harlan as
our "hero" any more than we are the authors of the joint opinion
in Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. We are
claiming only that in Poe and Casey, these justices propound a
better understanding of the "rational continuum" of liberty and
judgment- as they have operated in the American constitutional
practice of interpreting the Due Process Clause to protect
substantive liberties from Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) to the
present- than do originalist critics of substantive liberties like
Justice Scalia and communitarian critics of "rights talk" like

35.
36.
37.
38.

Kersch, supra note 1, at 412.
!d. at 416, 41H-19.
/d. at 419.
367 U.S. 497.542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Glendon. (pp. 237-72) Making this claim in no way commits us
to embracing Harlan's constitutional jurisprudence as a whole.
Truth be told, if there is a "hero" in our analysis of the Due
Process Clause, it is Justice Stevens. We praise his famous
critique of the framework of strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clausel embracing his argument for a "continuum of
judgmental responses" instead of a framework of absolutist,
rigidly maintained tiers of scrutiny. (p. 240) We model our
criticism of the framework of strict scrutiny under the Due
Process Clause on his critique, demonstrating an analogous
"continuum of judgmental responses." (pp. 240-41)
Finally, our exposing the "myth of strict scrutiny for
fundamental rights" under the Due Process Clause, contrary to
Kersch's suggestion, is not inconsistent with treating the basic
liberties protected under that clause as "preferred freedoms."
39
We are not throwing the baby out with the bathwater. We
argue that our constitutional practice has protected basic
liberties under the Due Process Clause "stringently"- thus
according them a "preferred position"- not absolutely, as they
would be under the mythical framework of strict scrutiny. (pp.
237-72)
D. OUR REASONS FOR FOCUSING ON THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE

We want to close by responding to Kersch's more general
criticism of our account of "ordered liberty" for its ''selection
bias." 40 We have written a book focusing on cases protecting
substantive basic liberties (or not) under the Due Process Clause
rather than a book more broadly covering "the full universe of
41
civil liberties concerns. " He evidently concedes that the cases
protecting rights under the Due Process Clause are "ripe for redescription as implicating serious questions of the public good,
42
responsibility, citizenship, and virtue."
But, Kersch argues, "the problem" is that these types of
cases are "only a small part of 'rights revolution' cases that
conservatives and communitarians criticize for being overly
solicitous of claims anchored in arguments about autonomy." He
continues: "Where, I wondered, was the discussion of the claims
39.
40.
41.
42.

Kersch, supra note 1, at 418.
!d. at 412, 414.
!d. at 419.
!d. at 414.
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of autonomy in cases involving, say, a jacket that says 'Fuck the
Draft,' flag-burning, nude-dancing, the possession of pornographic films, cross-burning, hateful disruptive protests at
military funerals, the banning of violent video games, the
aggressive defense of criminal process rights, including
aggressive assertions of the Fifth Amendment in cases involving
4
charges of domestic subversion, etc. ?" l
To the charge of "selection bias," we have three responses.
One, our decision to write a book focusing on cases protecting
substantive basic liberties (or not) under the Due Process Clause
rather than taking up all of the claims he mentions is eminently
defensible on the ground that these cases raise the "culture war"
issues that divide liberals from communitarians like Glendon
and civic republicans like Sandel. These cases have constituted
the most contested battleground concerning rights, responsibilities, and virtues in recent years.
Two, we would observe that, remarkably, at the present
time, on most of the First Amendment issues he mentions,
liberals and conservatives have united in support of a neutral,
absolutist First Amendment (though we reject it). We observed
this development in Chapter 2 of our book, noting that many
communitarians who call for encouraging responsibilities and
inculcating virtues where Due Process liberties are concerned
have embraced the neutral, absolutist First Arnendment and
rejected restrictions upon many of the types of speech that
Kersch lists. (pp. 37-39) Moreover, we specifically discussed the
military funeral protest case. Far from being "skittish" about
"those types of issues, '' 44 we criticized the conservative Roberts
Court for its absolutist First Amendment jurisprudence that
rejected the claims of community and harm. We expressed our
agreement with Justice Alito's dissent (and with retired Justice
Stevens's criticism) arguing that the case was wrongly decided.
(pp. 38-39)
And three, writing a book that aimed to analyze rights,
responsibilities, and virtues across all of constitutional law not
only would have been too unwieldy and too abstract, but also
probably would have been incoherent. We do not claim that
there is an aspiration to ordered liberty that embraces the "full
universe of civil liberties concerns." Our concern in the book is
with articulating "the most defensible ordering of rights,
43.
44.

/d.

!d..
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responsibilities, and virtues in the American constitutional
order" as far as substantive basic liberties protected (or not)
under the Due Process Clause are concerned. (p. 3) That project
is ambitious enough and in any case is eminently defensible.
III. ABNER S. GREENE, STATE SPEECH AND
POLITICAL LIBERALISM
If Toni Massaro assesses our project from the standpoint of
a sympathetic civic liberalism, Abner Greene criticizes it from
the standpoint of a fellow political liberal traveler. Over the
years, both of us have benefitted from engaging with Greene-in
person and in print-about various dilemmas posed by
pluralism, governmental speech, and a constitutional order
premised on, as he aptly calls it in the subtitle of his own recent
book, "multiple sources of authority." 4) For example, his work
has informed our own analysis of the tensions within our
constitutional order concerning the relationship between
government and civil society-whether the latter, as seedbeds of
civic virtue, is congruent with and undergirds the political order,
or instead functions as sources of norms and values distinct from
those and as a buffer against governmental power. (pp. 146-47)
In addition, we agree with Greene that government may use
methods short of coercion to persuade about public values and
constitutional principles.
However, Greene also maintains that government is "just
one repository" of the people's power among others and must
411
compete, after all, for the people's allegiance. By contrast, we
believe that the status of citizen and the ideal of free and equal
citizenship-and the norms attendant to being a citizen-are
weighty and not simply one contender in the marketplace for
allegiance. We also argue that, in addition to using its persuasive
power, government n1ay use tools like antidiscrimination laws to
promote free and equal citizenship. These laws are not simply
persuasive, in expressing ideals, but also harness the state's
coercive power by commanding people and institutions that they
may not act in certain ways-and must act in certain ways (that
is, provide goods and services in a nondiscriminatory 1natter).
This, of course, raises the question of the permissible scope of
exemption from such laws when the public norms they embody
45. ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012).
46.

/d. at 253.
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clash with the norms of what Greene calls "non1ic" groups or
47
communities.
Greene's critique of Ordered Liberty centers on his
contention that it departs from political liberalism and embraces
a comprehensive liberalism. He observes that we characterize
our project as being to develop a constitutional liberalism by
analogy to Rawls's political liberalism, as distinguished from a
comprehensive liberalism that would promote a comprehensive
conception of the good life. But he argues that we (as well as
4
Rawls) in fact promote a comprehensive liberalism. x A "true"
political liberalism, he suggests, would be more "open-minded at
4
a meta-level toward what may be good." " We should distinguish
two arguments he makes: (1) that even Rawls hin1self in fact
goes beyond a political liberalism to a comprehensive liberalism,
and therefore that our constitutional liberalism, to the extent it
builds upon Rawls, goes beyond political liberalism, and (2) to
the extent that we develop a "mild form of perfectionism" that
would engage in a formative project to inculcate liberal virtues,
we go beyond Rawls's political liberalism to a comprehensive
liberalism.
We have two responses. One, Rawls stays within political
liberalism as he conceives it as distinguished from comprehensive liberalism as he conceives it. We do not mean that
simply as a matter of definition. Rather, we mean that we do not
interpret him as proposing imposing a comprehensive liberal
conception of the good. Two, we did not claim to be explicating
Rawls's own views, or to be developing his constitutional theory,
but instead to be developing a constitutional liberalism by
analogy to Rawls's political liberalism, and to be applying that
Rawlsian view to topics that he himself did not address (or at
least did not fully address). In fact, we believe that our
constitutional liberalism is a civic liberalism that largely accords
with Rawls's political liberalism. We are reinforced in this view
by the fact that Stephen Macedo, who has developed a civic
liberalism concerned to secure liberal virtues, likewise conceives
his project as broadly speaking Rawlsian. 50
!d. at 55.
Greene, supra note I, at 422-30. For Greene's full argument that Rawls goes
beyond political liberalism to a comprehensive liberalism, see Abner S. Greene,
Uncommon Ground: A Review of Political Liberalism by John Rawls and Life's
Dominion by Ronald Dworkin, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646 (1994).
49. Greene, supra note I, at 433.
50. STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
47.

4~.
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Greene assesses our claim to be political liberals with
respect to "scope" and "grounds." He acknowledges that we
seem to be political liberals with respect to scope, for example,
we are concerned to inculcate civic virtues essential to
responsible citizenship, not moral virtues essential to the good
life simpliciter. And he concedes that we justify our project on
grounds of securing the capacities for responsible citizenship.
Still, it seems that our embrace of a "formative project" and our
characterization of our civic liberalism as a "mild form of
perfectionism" leads him to think that we have crossed the line
into comprehensive liberalism. 5 1
. In the end, the questio~ whether we. ~re ':true g~litical
hberals" or whether Greene IS a truer pohtlcal liberal Is less
important than the question whether we have put forward an
attractive and persuasive view. We believe that what drives
Greene's criticism is not so much a fastidious concern to be true
to political liberalism as it is a concern to defend his own
conception of pluralism over and against Rawls's and ours. He
rejects our "mild form of perfectionism" and indeed our "civic
liberalism" because of his rejection of what he calls the "'plenary
sovereignty" of the state and because of his argument for
"permeable sovereignty" and "the multiple sources of authority
53
in a liberal democracy." We believe that he is wary of talk
about government having a "fonnative project" because he sees
that as incompatible with his vision of the state as just one of
many sources of norms in the marketplace. In short, we think
that the debate between Greene and us is more fruitfully framed
as a debate between competing understandings of pluralism and
the aspiration to e pluribus unum than as between a true political
liberalism and a comprehensive liberalism. In his review, Greene
appeals to a "deep and wide pluralism" or a "marriage of
pluralism with political liberalism" that "permits groups to
develop apart from the state." This, he says, is "the best way to
apply an appropriate liberal sense of doubt about whether we've
54
gotten the right or best answers. " He makes a plea for a
55
constitutional "agnosticism. "

CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM ( 1990).
51. Greene, supra note 1, at 423-27.
52. !d. at 433 ..
53. GREENE, supra note 45, at 20-24.
54. Greene, supra note 1, at 422.
55. GREENE, supra note 45, at 23.
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Should we be so doubtful? One could read Ordered Liberty
as an argument "against agnosticism" with respect to the
importance of inculcating civic virtues and public values
notwithstanding pluralism. Further, we interpret our constitutional order to support the view that government is not
merely one among the many, but should have special weight in
terms of the demands it makes upon us-and the responsibilities
it has to us-as citizens. We disagree with Greene concerning
these matters, but there is not room in this brief response to
56
make the case fully.
Here we shall simply note two big reservations concerning
Greene's vision of pluralism. One, the aspiration to e pluribus
unum is likely to implode without a more ambitious aspiration to
unum- for example, an overlapping consensus among reasonable conceptions of the good and a formative project to inculcate
civic virtues in circumstances of pluralism- than he allows. Two,
we fear that the groups to which he would grant accommodations and exemptions in the name of the Free Exercise
Clause and his commitment to pluralism are not likely to accept
the litnits he would impose upon them in the name of the
Establishment Clause. We fear that such groups will not settle
for what Greene calls the "political balance" of the religion
57
clauses.
Moreover, we share Rawls's concern that
"unreasonable'' groups, instead of honoring the "duty of
civility," will not forbear the attempt to impose their own
comprehensive religious conceptions of the good through the
political process. 5x Greene's "balance" will prove to be too
"reasonable" for them.
Finally, we want to make clear that we do not in our book
develop a full blown theory of governmental speech. Greene
focuses, in tern1s of his title, on "state speech." And he pairs our
book with Corey Brettschneider's recent book entitled When the
State Speaks, What Should It Say?,w Brettschneider, like us, aims
to elaborate a political liberalism and, unlike us, does develop a
56. Each of us pursues our differences with Greene's approach set out in his book,
Against Obligation, in a forthcoming issue of Boston University Law Review: James E.
Fleming, Fit, Justification, and fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 93 B.U. L. REV.
_ (2013); Linda C. McClain, Against Agnosticism: Why the Liberal State Isn't Just One
(Authority) Among the Many, 93 B. U. L. REV._ (2013).
57. GREENE, supra note 45. at 149-57.
5X. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 58-66,217-19 (1993).
5lJ. COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT
SAY!: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY
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full blown view of governmental speech. Perhaps some of
Greene's remarks are better directed against Brettschneider's
theory of state speech than against our book. As suggested
above, our discussion of the First Amendment is more about: (1)
the tendency toward a rights absolutism in the protection of
individual speech even among communitarians (Chapter 2), and
(2) First Amendment clashes involving institutions of civil
society and governmental promotion of equality, whether
through antidiscrimination laws or marriage equality laws
(Chapter 6). We want to observe an irony in Greene's criticism
of our view with respect to state speech. He criticizes us (as well
as Brettschneider) for going beyond political liberalism to
comprehensive liberalism. Ordinarily, that would seem to imply
that we see a larger role for the state in promoting a vision of the
good life than would political liberals. Yet Greene argues that,
within his own truer political liberalism, the state has a freer
hand and a larger role in seeking to persuade people concerning
a wide range of conceptions of the good. 60
IV. CONCLUSION: ALL THAT YOU CAN'T LEAVE
BEHIND
We are honored that our book has prompted such
thoughtful engagement by Massaro, Kersch, and Greene. Their
essays demonstrate many of the complexities of working up an
account of the ordering of rights, responsibilities, and virtues in
our constitutional democracy at the present time: all that you
can't leave behind, as U2 put it. Understanding and reimagining
ordered liberty in circumstances of deepening pluralism and
partisanship-when it may be "even worse than it looks"h 1 -is an
imperative project. The essays also raise questions for further
research, many of which we expect to pursue in future work.

60.
61.

Greene, supra note 1, at 428-29, 431-32.
We allude to THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE
THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE
NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012).

